A new column in Daily Sabah by security scholar Murat Yeşiltaş makes a blunt argument: the Türkiye-Israel relationship has moved past ordinary geopolitical competition and is turning into a direct security challenge, with consequences that ripple across the Eastern Mediterranean.
The core of the argument is about capability, not rhetoric. Israel's defence establishment increasingly reads Türkiye as its main emerging adversary because of what Ankara can do, not what it says. Türkiye fields one of NATO's largest standing armies, has built a defence industry spanning armed drones, long-range strike systems, layered air defence and a fifth-generation fighter programme, and has the political weight to project influence in several theatres at once. That kind of assessment, the column notes, does not change with a change of government in Jerusalem.
It is not just Netanyahu-era posturing either. In February, former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett publicly framed Türkiye as "the new Iran." More significantly, Israel's Nagel Committee, which reviewed long-term defence spending in a January 2025 report, warned that Turkish influence in Syria could raise the risk of direct confrontation and recommended a decade of higher defence investment in air power, intelligence, satellites and long-range operations.
Syria is where doctrine is already visible. Israel holds nine military positions in southern Syria, including on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, and has ruled out withdrawal. It struck the Abu al-Duhur airfield in Idlib eight times in August, citing a possible Turkish deployment, and has resisted a US-proposed deconfliction mechanism among Israel, Türkiye and Syria — apparently because formalising one would legitimise Türkiye's role there.
The Aegean is the other front. On 31 August, Israel and Greece signed the "Achilles Shield" agreement in Tel Aviv, worth roughly €3 billion ($3.5 billion) — Israel's largest defence deal with Greece. It combines David's Sling, SPYDER and Barak MX systems with ELTA radars and a national command network. The column flags a less obvious implication: long-range radars on Türkiye's western flank could give Israel persistent visibility over Turkish air activity. It also notes the deal contains no mutual-defence guarantee, so Greece bought systems rather than a protector.
Ankara's response so far has been to deepen its Syria footprint rather than retreat. After the Idlib strikes, Turkish ministers travelled to Damascus to sign energy and phosphate cooperation deals, with a $10 billion bilateral trade target on the table and a presidential visit expected.
Why should a traveller care? Because these frictions shape the practical realities of the region: airspace considerations on routes between Europe and the Middle East, the cautious mood around travel to Syria and border areas, and the noticeably warmer tourism and business ties between Türkiye and Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. None of this currently disrupts holidays in Istanbul, Antalya or the Greek islands, but anyone travelling widely in the Eastern Mediterranean should keep an eye on how the Israel-Türkiye file develops.
Daily Sabah Travel